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Abstract: 
Analytical essay dealing with Latin American integration process, its peculiarities and  
the recent development trends in the region. Instead of deepening its integration 
process, Latin America is experiencing a clear fragmentation path, with many 
divergences among leading countries in the domains of economic policies and the 
integration processes, notwithstanding the fact that new instances were created for that 
objective (Unasur, Celac). The essay also examines Brazil’s economic and political role 
in the region, and concludes by an assessment of current trends (comparing the region 
with Asia Pacific) and advance prospects for divergent trends in Latin America. 
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1. Latin American recent development trends 
 
Since the implosion of socialism in the former Soviet Union – or perhaps 
even earlier, since the beginning of China’s transition to capitalism, under Deng 
Xiao-ping – the world economy has entered in what has been called the third 
wave of globalization; the two previous were, the global unification of the known 
world first started by the great navigations of the 16th century, soon afterwards 
closed by colonial exclusions, after which came the true constitution of a world 
economy under the second industrial revolution, during the short lived Belle 
époque (1870-1914). Interrupted temporarily by the First World War and 
effectively barred by the Bolshevik revolution in half of the Eurasia continent, 
globalization receded for at least three generations, as not only Russia (with 
some other satellites, conquered after the Second World War) but also newly 
independent countries from Latin America chose to partially retract from the 
world economy in order to start national development processes, characterized 
                                                     
1 Diplomata; Professor Uniceub (Brasília) (www.pralmeida.org; http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com) 
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by introverted sectorial economic policies, trade protectionism, industrial 
nationalism and State intervention.  
It is important, methodologically, to make a distinction, albeit a formal 
one, between three historically successive configurations of the global market 
system: (a) a world economy, such as the one inaugurated by the great 
navigations linking the Western Europe to old nations in the Asia Pacific and 
the new lands in America; (b) an international economy, such as the one arising 
from the first and, especially, the second industrial revolution; (c) the current 
interdependent economy, started at the Bretton Woods (1944) and the Havana 
(1947-48) diplomatic conferences, which created the new institutions of our 
world economic order, spanning originally from the Western capitalist 
economies to some other market economies in the extreme East (Japan, for 
example), encompassing most of the dependent periphery – that is, the so-
called Third World – but excluding the so-called Second World, that is, the 
socialist economies. These two were restricted to an asymmetric interaction 
with the first ones, exchanging their raw materials and energy against 
manufactured products and capital goods, importing capital, but with little or 
nothing to say in the decision making process of the institutions representative 
of the global capitalist system.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the international economy was interrupted 
in 1914, it became for the first time in History a truly interdependent economy 
from 1945 onward, as guided by the Bretton Woods institutions and the 
multilateral trade system embodied in the Gatt,. A large part of national 
economies, encompassing perhaps more than two thirds of the world’s 
population (counting in not only the Soviet empire, but also Maoist China and 
semi-socialist India), remained, by and large, at the margin of world markets 
and outside the international division of work, only participating in 
international exchanges in a minor scale, mostly through the commodities 
markets and a few other low-value added goods. Latin American countries, for 
the most, not only confirmed their early historical features as primary exporting 
economies, but, starting at the Depression of the 1930s, and more actively since 
the 1950s, engaged in an import substitution industrializing process that closed 
them off the productive integrated capitalist system, as nationalistic inclinations 
drove their economic policies. Results from those choices were mixed: if they 
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acquired real capabilities in consumer goods production, they remained 
dependent in capital goods and never acquired real autonomy in innovation and 
high technology, not to mention their continued foreign financing dependency 
and specialized know-how. 
Permissive monetary expansion, irresponsible fiscal policies, 
mismanagement in the exchange regimes coincided with booms and busts 
economic cycles, recurring falls in hyperinflation and eventual external debt 
crises, which led many of Latin American countries to the emergency care units 
of the Bretton Woods institutions, through IMF’s stand-by agreements. Brazil, 
Argentina and Mexico, were champions in stabilization plans. Brazil specifically 
had, eight currencies which replaced one another in a time span of three 
generations, since 1942. However, within a single generation, it managed to 
replace its currency six times from 1986 to 1994. Mexico also, despite being an 
oil exporter, and benefiting from the rises in prices associated wit the two oil 
shocks, incurred, like the others, in fiscal mismanagement, budget deficits and 
heavy indebtedness. The external debt crisis of the 1980s were followed by 
economic reforms in most countries of the region, under the label of neoliberal 
policies, with their prescription of privatization, deregulation and the reduction 
of the economic role of the State. Some countries performed successfully the 
path towards stabilization and economic opening, like Chile, while others did 
not achieve the complete set of reforms, such as Argentina and Brazil. 
The two biggest countries of the Southern Cone emerged from the hard 
times of military dictatorship, in the middle 1980s, with big challenges in the 
economic domain. Both tried successive stabilization plans, with currency 
changes each time, and finally conquered inflation through two contrasting 
ways: Argentina first, in 1991, by means of a currency board – that is, pegging 
its new currency to the dollar, by a fixed parity – and Brazil three years later, in 
1994, by means of an indexed currency, then flexibly pairing it with the dollar, 
which served as an anchor. Both plans entered turbulent times by the end of 
that decade: Brazil, taken in the maelstrom of Asian financial crises and the 
Russian moratorium, was forced to devaluate its currency, adhering thereafter 
to a floating exchange rate and an inflation target regime; Argentina, because of 
a high indebtedness and loss of external competitiveness (causing growing, 
unsustainable, trade deficits), had to abandon its fixed parity, in the midst of a 
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profound economic crisis, accompanied by the insolvency of its whole external 
debt. Argentina imposed an unilateral default on its foreign creditors, and 
remained excluded from international capital markets since then. 
 
2. The integration process and its peculiarities 
At the same time they started the re-democratization process, Argentina 
and Brazil renewed old projects for economic integration: confidence-building 
measures were adopted in the nuclear domain, with new protocols guiding 
reciprocal inspections in their respective nuclear installations. Agreements were 
signed for a progressive liberalization of bilateral trade, and an integration 
treaty was achieved in 1988 for a ten years delay in the implementation of a 
common market. In 1990, this term was reduced to five years, inducing other 
countries to join the move. Negotiations were held in the second semester of 
that year, and, in March 1991, the Asunción Treaty was signed in the 
Paraguayan capital, creating Mercosur, the Common Market of the South, 
adjoining Uruguay and Paraguay to the two biggest countries of the Southern 
Cone; Chile was part of the negotiation, but could not adhere to the group 
because some years prior it had already reformed its tariff schedule in the Gatt 
system, adopting then a single tariff, incompatible with the other countries’ 
planning for a Common External Tariff. 
Mercosur was very dynamic in its early years, doubling its intra-trade 
and also increasing external trade and investment links. Andean countries also 
rushed towards new dynamics, transforming the old Andean Pact into the 
Andean Community of Nations (CAN, in its Spanish acronym), while Chile 
pursued its solitary itinerary of entering into free trade agreement with 
whichever countries available for that: since middle 1990s, Chile, along with 
Mexico, signed almost three dozens agreements of that type, opening market 
access with over 80% of the global GDP, including the whole Americas, 
European Union and other European countries, half of Asia (including Japan, 
China and Korea), and also Australia and New Zealand. Compared to that 
performance, Mercosur and CAN have just a few trade liberalization agreements 
(not full free trade), linking them reciprocally and with just a few countries, 
however not the most important ones (Israel, South Africa, and India, but just 
for fixed and limited trade preferences).  
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Advancing into the new millennium, Mercosur accomplished almost 
nothing in terms of commercial arrangements, having been diverted to a social 
and political agenda by the new rulers in Brazil and Argentina, respectively the 
Worker’s Party (PT) and a branch of the Peronist movement, now controlled by 
the Kirchner family. Some Andean countries, such as Colombia and Peru, chose 
to follow Chile and Mexico in the path of deep liberalization, negotiating free 
trade agreements with the United States, the European Union, and other 
countries in the region and elsewhere, especially in Asia. Most important, these 
last four countries decided to undertake a new integration scheme, forming, in 
2011, the Pacific Alliance, formally establishing complete free trade amongst 
them, but in fact with the objective of coordinating their initiatives towards the 
most dynamic region in the multilateral trade system, the Asia Pacific basin, 
together with other Western Hemisphere willing partners (such as Canada, 
USA, Mexico and others), and also Australia and New Zealand. 
The four Latino countries of the Pacific coast have just one third of the 
Latin America’s GDP, less than the total of the five members of Mercosur – 
which accepted Bolivarian Venezuela as a new member since 2012 – but they 
export about 60 percent more than the Mercosur bloc, and are much more open 
to any kind of trade and investment links. Mercosur, less successful because of 
the policies followed since early 2000s by Argentina and Brazil, was diverted 
from its original path and became a mere consortium devoted to rhetoric 
exhortations in favor of integration while accomplishing very little towards the 
implementation of this objective. Attentive observers are making more 
optimistic prospects for the Pacific Alliance than for Mercosur, considered by 
many of those a failed undertaking, not exactly because of its start as a customs 
union, but because of the erroneous national economic policies followed since 
2003. 
Unasur, the Union of South American Nations, created by a Brazilian 
initiative aiming to “liberate the region from the heavy hand of the Empire” (the 
US), is just one more ineffective piece of rhetorical fervor in favor of integration 
while being dominated by the same Bolivarian countries – Venezuela en tête – 
which spouse an anti-imperialist speech in place and lieu of true integration 
projects. Since its inception, it has advanced nothing in terms of physical 
integration of South American countries – its original endeavor – but 
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accomplished everything in defense of the said Bolivarian countries, a bunch of 
populist and authoritarian regimes, which are destroying the bases of market 
economies and democracy in the region. Unasur has done absolutely nothing, 
for instance, in face of continuous violations of human rights and democratic 
freedoms in Venezuela, agonizing now in a deep economic and political crisis. 
Ten years prior, the same group of countries – Argentina, Brazil and 
Venezuela – now leading Unasur into its Bolivarian path, were responsible, at 
the Americas Summit of Mar del Plata (November 2005), for the implosion of 
the American project of a Free Trade Area in the Americas (FTAA), an initiative 
of the Clinton Administration, launched in the Miami Summit (December 
1994), with the objective of liberalizing trade and investment flows in the 
hemisphere, and creating common policies in some other areas (intellectual 
property, non tariff barriers, sectorial regulations and so on). President Lula of 
Brazil was very proud of this accomplishment, saying that the US led project 
was much more directed to the annexation of Latin American countries than to 
a real economic integration. One of the consequences of the implosion of the 
FTAA was the “minilateralist” approach adopted since then by the U.S., linking 
like-minded countries in a network of trade agreements and economic treaties 
that bypassed the obstruction of the protectionist countries. 
 
3. Fragmentation of development policies and of the integration 
process? 
Around the time of the decolonization process, at the beginning of the 
1960s, one of the leading development economists, later to become Nobel, 
Gunnar Myrdal, predicted, in a three volume research work, Asian Drama, 
some notable things: that Asian countries were condemned to utter misery and 
poverty; that if there were a group of countries capable of doing a catching-up 
towards the developed club of countries – the OECD bloc – this had to be the 
Latin American countries, independent since the early 19th century, adopting 
self-sustained policies of industrialization and practicing State guidance in the 
strategic sectors of the economy; and also that, if there was one single country in 
Asia capable of repeating the feature, that should be India, with its semi-
socialistic planned economy, extensive controls over foreign investment, trade 
and capital flows relying heavily on the State induced stimuli in selected sectors 
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of the economy. Myrdal was then praised as a prescient economist and taken for 
his words. 
History, and the Asian countries (much more Pacific, than Southern Asia, 
or India) proved Gunnar Myrdal totally wrong: a complete reversion occurred 
between one and other group of countries: Pacific Asia and Latin America 
traded places in every aspect of their development, in terms of rates of growth, 
fiscal patterns and respective shares of world trade flows. This inversion of roles 
started in the sixties, pursued throughout the seventies, and accelerated during 
the eighties, as globalization started to encompass every corner of the planet, 
but with minor impact in Latin America, Africa and Middle East. Just to follow 
the itinerary of some selected countries in each one of the regions during the 
third wave of globalization, it is enough to verify the departing level of average 
national income per head, and the same level after three and a half decades of 
differential rates of growth, as revealed in the table below. 
 
Levels of GDP per capita (in Purchasing 
Power Parity) between 1980 and 2014, in 
some selected countries from Latin America 
and Asia Pacific 
Countries 1980  2014 2014/1980 
Latin American countries 
Argentina 4.893 22.101 4.5 
Brazil 3.690 15.153 4.1 
Chile 2.921 23.165 7.9 
Colombia 2.442 13.148 5.3 
Mexico 4.980 17.925 3.6 
Peru 2.965 11.988 4.0 
Venezuela 5.754 17,917 3.1 
Average: $, 
growth 
4,607.50 20,232.83 4.39 
Asia Pacific countries 
China 250 12. 893 51.5 
South Korea 2.302 35.485 15.4 
Hong Kong 6.790 55.166 8.1 
Indonesia 729 10.156 13.9 
Malaysia 318 24.520 77.1 
Thailand 1.090 14.442 13.2 
Taiwan 3.570 43.600 12.2 
Average: $, 
growth 
2,508.16 32,760.33 13.06 
Latin America to Asia Pacific income in 
1980 
1.83 
Asia Pacific to Latin America income in 
1980 
0.54 
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Latin America to Asia Pacific income in 
2014 
0.61 
Asia Pacific to Latin America income in 
2014 
1.62 
Source: US$; Economy Watch (economywatch.com). 
 
Despite an arbitrary selection of countries for each region, they seem to 
be representative of the most dynamic countries in each side, albeit excluding 
Singapore, a truly impressive case of rapid growth even more than that of 
Malaysia, for instance. The figures confirm that the GDP per head growth in 
Asia Pacific was almost eight times higher than its average level reached in Latin 
America. Even excluding the “distorting” figures for China and Malaysia, as 
both departed from very low levels, and those of Hong Kong, which already 
started at satisfactory income level, the indicators there would still be four times 
higher than the results achieved in the Latin American group.  
Latin American countries, during most of the recent times, and with few 
exceptions – the “Asian tiger” here being Chile, in the same manner as 
Philippines was the “Latin American laggard” in the Asia Pacific – have been 
protectionist, and too inclined to State intervention, characteristics also 
associated with some Asian countries in their respective phases of 
industrialization and accelerated growth. The differences, probably, are to be 
located in education, fiscal policies and external opening. Liberal reforms 
undertaken in Latin America during the 1980s have partially stabilized 
economies plagued by high inflation rates and monetary profligacy, but few 
countries – the exception being Chile, again – pursued the structural reforms 
further, in order to open their economies, liberalize trade, control State 
expenditures, qualify the work force, improve the infrastructure, and attract 
foreign investments, including in sectors previously functioning under State 
monopolies. Chile benefitted from a complete set of reforms, and experienced 
Asian-like rates of growth for many years. Other countries – either for lack of a 
competent leadership, or for the well-known “raw materials curse” (the sad 
example is Venezuela of course) – were condemned to an erratic boom and bust 
process of growth, followed by recurrent crises or even recession. It is not a 
surprise, historically, that Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela fit exactly this 
unhappy pattern. 
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By and large, most of Latin American countries remained confirmed in 
their roles of primary products exporters, a characteristic even reinforced in the 
last decade by the impressive growth of China, turned their first trade partner, 
taking the place previously held by the United States for more than a century 
(but less in the case of Argentina). The new dependency on Chinese demand is 
perhaps similar to the century old colonial trade patterns between advanced 
industrial economies and the colonial or semi-colonial periphery, that is, 
nowadays developing countries in the Third World. Brazil, for instance, exports 
95 percent of raw materials to China and imports 95 per cent of manufactured 
goods from China. This asymmetric relationship promises to endure for some 
time with no great changes in sight. Any new Chinese investments in Brazil will 
be in infrastructure to facilitate the exports of raw materials to feed its huge 
productive machine, or in industries that will compete against American or 
European (or Brazilian) factories, to supply the local markets and those of the 
neighboring South American countries. 
In recent years, Latin American countries have differentiated among 
themselves along three lines of development, encompassing grosso modo the 
three more important groups in the region: the Alliance of the Pacific is clearly 
identified with policies and practices that could allow its members to be called 
“globalizers”, that is, open to free trade agreements and almost no restrictions to 
foreign direct investments; Mercosur members for their side, especially 
Argentina and Brazil, could be said to be “reticent countries”, as they hesitate in 
the economic opening and trade liberalization, and pursue old protectionist 
policies and State guidance for private investment; finally, for lack of a better 
label, there is no proper designation for the “Bolivarian” countries – Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Ecuador – because some of them did not retract so deep in the State 
control, exchange manipulation, nationalization and expropriation of private 
enterprises in the same manner as Venezuela did, albeit all of them maintain a 
real mistrust of free trade and normal market regulations. More important, this 
Bolivarian group share the same populist and authoritarian behavior, with some 
reflections on the economic domain. 
 
4. Brazil’s economic and political role in the region 
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A century ago Brazil was a very backward country, essentially an 
agricultural economy, with coffee responding for almost 70 percent of total 
exports and more than 30 percent of State export receipts, with few industries 
and an income per head that was a tenth of the American level, and five times 
less than the Argentinean average revenue. Despite a frustrating record in terms 
of social progress – due to a low quality education – the rates of economic 
growth for the most of the 20th century, up to the 1980s, were really impressive, 
sometimes at current Chinese levels, in the average of 4,5 percent a year from 
the 1930s up to the external debt crisis of 1982. The military regime (1964-
1985), modernizing and technocratic, was a kind of Bismarckian model of 
Statecraft combined with a Stalinist-like industrialization, favoring the 
bourgeoisie, as the income concentration increased significantly during that 
period. The two oil shocks and the external debt, together with a renewed and 
strong Civilian opposition, closed the military interregnum and their will to rule 
(probably forever). 
After almost two decades of negligible growth, reforms undertaken by the 
two Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administrations (1995-2002) prepared the 
country for a sustained growth, which finally arrived after the Asian financial 
crises of the 1990s, and coinciding with the high demand for primary products 
from China. Indeed, the first Lula administration (2003-2006) and half of the 
second (prior to the American recession) were characterized by satisfactory 
rates of growth, only to be squandered by a disastrous economic performance by 
Lula’s successor, Dilma Russeff; her first administration was a total failure and 
an economic disaster, whit more inflation (the double of the official target), 
manipulation and devaluation of the currency, low growth (despite of an 
expressive growth in consumption credit and in affordable housing programs), 
and double deficits, both in domestic accounts and external transactions. 
In fact, during the whole period starting in 2003, Brazil growth was 
inferior to the average rate of Latin America, less than the world growth rates 
and three times less than the more dynamic emerging countries. The reasons 
are to be located in a very low savings rate, a mediocre investment rate, and an 
“OECD level” of government receipts: taxation is as high as 36 percent of the 
GDP, meanwhile the income per head is four or five times below OECD’s level. 
Brazilian State imposes a very heavy fiscal charge over its citizens and private 
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companies, expends more than two fifths of the GDP, including a heavy service 
for the domestic debt, and does not offer services or investment levels 
commensurate with the revenue extraction it exerts against the very creators of 
riches.  
Succeeding the structural reforms of the 1990s, Lula’s years in charge 
saw no reform at all; to the contrary, even if his administration has not reverted 
the many privatizations accomplished by Cardoso, he conducted an overall 
growth of the State, creating many new state companies, increasing the number 
of public officials to new heights, accruing State expenditures above both the 
rates of growth and the inflation, with very few productive investments. Also, 
corruption levels went rampant, for instance in Petrobras, the state oil 
company, almost destroyed by mismanagement, inflated purchases and foreign 
contracts signed carelessly (or perhaps undertaken at shamefully inflated prices, 
and deliberately for somber purposes). 
Notwithstanding the poor performance at domestic level, reception of 
Lula’s activism abroad was synonymous of success, even if there was more 
transpiration (in terms of propaganda) than inspiration. Foreign policy 
departed from the very cautious postures adopted traditionally by Itamaraty – 
the Foreign ministry – and embarked on a clear partisan policy, aiming to 
please the leftist and anti-imperialist Worker’s Party and other socialist 
movements in Brazil. Externally, Lula’s government adhered to, and also 
created its own, policies of all kinds directed to “change the geopolitical 
relations” in the world – deemed too hegemonic, unilateralist and imperialist – 
and to push for “a new trade geography in the world”, both with an anti-
hegemonic flavor and under the banner of “South-South diplomacy”. Alliances 
with supposed “strategic partners” were devised, first with India and South 
Africa – in the IBSA group –, soon afterwards with the so-called group Bric, 
suggested by an investor economist as the big emerging economies of China, 
Russia, India and Brazil – later to politically include South Africa as well – but 
artificially promoted by Brazil and Russia as a formal diplomatic group.  
Considering Brazilian diplomacy since 2003, it is important to stress that 
the modus operandi combined formal procedures proper to Itamaraty and 
political goals and objectives intimately associated with PT’s ideology, a typical 
leftist party guided by anti-imperialistic instinct and obscure Cuban links. The 
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three most important diplomatic priorities of Lula’s administration were: to 
conquer a permanent siege at the UN Security Council, to reinforce and to 
expand Mercosur in South America, and to make commercial gains through a 
successful conclusion of the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. Not 
a single one was reached during his two mandates or during its “natural 
extension”, Dilma’s first presidency, and none are ready to be accomplished 
during her second mandate, because of overoptimistic and erroneous 
assumptions made at the start. All three objectives were conceived and 
implemented on the basis of the referred South-South diplomacy, and the 
alliance with the anti-hegemonic strategic partners, such as China and Russia, 
the two authoritarian members of the Brics. 
For different motivations, but with the same consequences, these two 
countries never sustained the objective of their two original and democratic 
companions in the Bric, India and Brazil, to be accepted as new permanent 
members of the UNSC, despite a worldwide campaign by Lula’s diplomacy to 
gain support in the Southern hemisphere. As regards the third objective, having 
a successful conclusion of the Doha round, most of the blame – besides 
reluctance by the U.S. and EU with the agricultural agreement – fells also on 
some of other strategic partners, namely India and Argentina, both opposed to 
industrial tariffs reduction and India’s posture against agricultural 
liberalization. The Mercosur project and South America integration are special 
cases in the agenda, which deserve a more detailed examination. 
Notwithstanding a gradual recovery of the intra and extra-Mercosur 
trade, after the crises affecting Brazil and Argentina between 1999 and 2002, 
the resumption of economic growth in member countries was not enough to 
overcome the many economic fragilities which still hinder the bloc. In fact, the 
promises of trade liberalization made at various stages of the integration 
process were never realized, and the customs union announced in 1995 was real 
only in paper. Since the start of Lula’s and Kirchner’s administrations, in 2003, 
no substantive advances were accomplished in the domain of commercial 
integration, and, to the contrary, more restrictions – inwards and outwards – 
were introduced at each successive challenge, either caused by external, or 
domestic factors. The blame is to be equally divided between its two major 
members, and their protectionist instincts, but, mostly, it is to be attributed to 
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the unilateral safeguards imposed by Argentina against imported products, 
including those from Brazil, its most important partner up to recently (China is 
taking the first posts everywhere). But Lula was totally compliant with 
Argentinean control of importations, even cooperating with them, accepting 
self-imposed restrictions on Brazilian exports, notwithstanding the fact that 
Argentina’s measures ran against Mercosur’s and Gatt’s rules on the matter. 
To compensate for the lack of progress – in fact, a retrocession – in the 
chapter of commercial integration, the two countries devised new institutions in 
non-trade areas, especially in political and social sectors, either bilaterally or as 
multilateral cooperation among member countries and with some neighbors in 
the region. Some of the instruments were taught to incorporate civil society into 
the integration process, for instance, trade unions and cultural organizations, 
while others were directed to public institutions other than the Executive power. 
Even if its inherent powers are at most theoretical, a Parliament of Mercosur 
was created, with equal representation from each member country, despite the 
huge differences among them. A Monetary Institution has been suggested, 
notwithstanding the fact that no coordination of macroeconomic policies 
existed at all, and that exchange policies and monetary and fiscal goals are 
determined independently (and contradictorily) by each national economic 
authority. 
 
5. Assessment and prospects: more of the same for Latin America? 
Economic studies emanating from independent research think tanks and 
from international organizations – such as IMF and OECD – have reached a 
common agreement for most of their predictions concerning major developed 
countries and emerging economies: there will be a very slow recovery from the 
low growth in advanced economies – with a more sustained path in the US than 
in Europe – together with delayed reforms in many developing countries. 
Pending on some hidden bubbles in the US and China, or even in Russia, there 
are still prospects for dynamic trends in major emerging countries, such as 
India and China. Russia and Brazil, together with some Latin American 
countries, did not profit from the bonanza of the 2000s to improve their 
respective fiscal positions or to diversify their exporting sector, which remained 
too concentrated on a small number of commodities. Predictions for the 
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remaining Brics countries, Brazil, Russia and South Africa, are that they will 
continue to suffer from lack of adjustments during the good years of 
commodities boom and will grow at very low levels, not excluding recession in 
2015. 
According to some reports, Latin America as a whole is to grow less than 
the world average in the next few years, and the three big countries in South 
America – Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela – are, in fact, going to have a 
negative growth in 2015, and possibly in 2016 also; they respond for a large part 
of the region’s GDP and trade. Forecasts for three South American countries, 
Chile, Peru and Colombia, that, together with Mexico, in North America, form 
the Pacific Alliance, are that they will have moderate but sustained growth in the 
foreseeable future, due to their choice of a globalized economic strategy, relying 
much more on the dynamic exchanges that take place in the Pacific rim than in 
their intra-regional trade; in fact, the four decided to act together thinking in 
their outward flows with other regions, not between each other.  
The truth is that political arrangements that were made for both 
Mercosur and Unasur are not paying off, mostly due to the fact that they rely 
much more on managed or administered trade than real free trade agreements. 
National regulatory dispositions related to public works in infrastructure are 
incompatible with each other, so very few integration projects are really being 
carried out in the domains of transportation, energy or telecommunications, 
including due to the fact that in some countries (the so-called “globalizers”) 
those sectors are open to private, or foreign, investors, while the heavy hand and 
the control of the State are still prevalent in many others (Bolivarians ahead). 
After reforms undertaken in the 1980s, populist and pro-State political leaders 
were elected in the late 1990s and 2000s, who turned back the clock of 
modernizing efforts inspired in the Washington Consensus prescriptions. Many 
political leaders in Latin America are looking with nostalgic feelings to the 
1960s, not to the future. 
This is one of the reasons for the integration process and the economic 
opening started in the 1980s to be held back from previous commitments of 
continuous trade liberalization. In Mercosur, for instance, the customs union 
that was built out of the free trade zone put in place during the transitional 
period (1991-1994), and formally started in 1995, probably now covers less 
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products and creates less trade flows than it was the case in the beginning. 
According to some observers, less than 10 per cent of imported items within 
Mercosur are done under the rates established by the Common External Tariff. 
One other reason is the huge Chinese penetration in many local markets in 
South America: some countries, such as Brazil, has now China as their first 
trade partners, with USA and European Union ranked in second or third places. 
Even in the case of the largest reciprocal trade relationship in Mercosur and in 
South America, that of Brazil-Argentina, the new linkages with the Asian giant 
are strongly impacting the bloc and remodeling the commercial patterns inside 
and outside the continent.  
Mercosur, according to the original Brazilian idea, was conceived as the 
center and the hub of a larger free trade space in South America, and as a 
common platform for trade negotiations at the hemispheric and global levels; 
but lack of progress in those directions is holding back Mercosur as a serious 
partner for multilateral bargaining in the WTO trade talks or for a successful 
conclusion of an almost two decade long discussion with European Union for an 
association and trade agreement. After the political decision to accept Venezuela 
in the bloc, in 2012, and the possible association of two other “Bolivarian” 
countries – Bolivia and Ecuador – with it, the possibility of having negotiating 
process with European or Asian countries for trade agreements, or even at the 
hemispheric level again, is less likely than ever. So, except for the four member 
of the Pacific Alliance, the prospects are for a further diminution of the share of 
those South American countries in the world trade flows. And, excepting a 
sustained price level for their exported commodities, not only the volume and 
diversification, but also the value of their respective external trade is expected to 
shrink in the context of the whole international trade. Latin America loses its 
share in favor of Asia Pacific. 
Indeed, as we have seen in the table of income levels in 1980 and in 2014, 
Chile and Colombia are the two sole countries which advanced above of the 
average level of GDP per capita; the fact that they could be included in a 
“globalizer” club, together with Peru (which has sped up both its economic 
opening and growth rates in recent years), is a good bet on which countries can 
be winners in the world race for a full productive integration into the capitalist 
globalization. Observing the remaining countries of the region, where 
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protectionist and interventionist practices are still in the economic policy menu, 
there is no surprise at all that the Asian region, in general, performed well ahead 
Latin America in economic growth and raise in income levels. No one is talking 
of true liberalism in one or other region, but it is a fact that the State in Latin 
America was historically used to keep the oligarchs in power, and after, during 
the industrializing process, the mismanagement in fiscal, monetary and 
exchange policies represented a clear difference compared with similar policies 
in the Asian region, not mentioning the appalling scenario related to public 
education, well behind acceptable levels of learning proficiency in Latin 
America.  
Brazil is a case in point, in both economic policies and educational 
performance. In the OECD’s Program of International Student Assessment – a 
comparative ranking of middle level learning achievement in Language, Science 
and Mathematics – Brazil and Argentina are amongst the worst achievers in the 
regular evaluations, behind countries with inferior income levels. Also, the two, 
together with Venezuela, have squandered previous attempts at economic 
stabilization, low inflation rates and external accounts equilibrium, and have 
performed very poorly in economic growth in recent years (and probably in the 
near future too). Brazil, like the United States at global level, Germany in 
Europe, and China and Japan in the Asian region, could be the engine for 
growth, integration, and economic liberalization in the region; instead of that, 
Brazil is lowering growth prospects in South America and for Latin American 
indicators. This is due to a exceptionally bad management of its economy – both 
in macro and sectorial policies – by the Worker’s Party apparatchiks, who are 
particularly inefficient in combining economic reforms and socially sustainable 
distribution policies. They have turned Brazil back to the precedent era of high 
inflation, low growth, and double deficits (budget and external accounts). The 
whole set of distribution mechanisms artificially created during the last decade 
(subsidies for the poor, for popular housing, but also for the rich, through low 
interests in borrowing from National Development Bank) are being reduced due 
to a fiscal deficit higher that 7% of the GDP, the direct consequence of high 
expenditures in the last three years, to support the reelection of the current 
president. In fact, Brazil is going back more than two decades of previous 
stabilization programs and serious efforts at redressing the national accounts.  
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The recurrence of fiscal deficits, high inflation, protectionism, external 
disequilibria – is nothing new in Latin America, but the real news is  that the 
continent, for the first time, is fragmented between those countries that have 
choose to integrate themselves into the world economy, and the other half that 
preferred to rely on old economic practices and on the same populist measures 
of the past. The test of reality is already being applied to the discomfort of the 
later, and Brazil is unhappily among them. Worse than that: current Worker’s 
Party government is betraying the best diplomatic traditions of Brazil, as almost 
everyone in and out of the region is horrified by the terrible violations against 
democracy and human rights that are being committed in Venezuela, in Cuba, 
and in other authoritarian countries, in the region and elsewhere, to which the 
Worker’s Party government choose to give its political support. Current times, 
decidedly, are not the best for Brazil, or for the region, and we’ll have to wait till 
political education, and the mobilization of civil society, are able to redress, by 
political means, the retrocession in governance and morals that are nowadays in 
place.   
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